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Tony Blair’s political instinct typically is to associate himself only with the future.  
As such, his explicit appeal to ‘the past’ in his references to New Labour’s desire to 
establish a “new Bretton Woods” is sufficient in itself to arouse some degree of analytical 
curiosity (see Blair 1998a).  The fact that this appeal was made specifically in relation to 
Bretton Woods is even more interesting.  The resonant image of the international 
economic context established by the original Bretton Woods agreements invokes a style 
and content of policy-making which Tony Blair typically dismisses as neither 
economically nor politically consistent with his preferred vision of the future (see Blair 
2000c, 2001b). 
Here, as elsewhere, Labour’s leaders’ tendency to place the adjective ‘new’ in front 
of concepts whose meaning was previously relatively settled in public discourse raises a 
number of questions.  Does ‘new’ actually mean qualitatively novel in this instance?  If 
so, why the appeal to the ‘old’ institutional framework of Bretton Woods?  Alternatively, 
is this merely an attempt to re-invent the past?  If so, why the use of the word ‘new’ at 
all?  Does Labour envisage ‘to throw sand in the wheels of international finance’, as 
James Tobin famously put it in his proposals to use market incentives to slow the pace at 
which financial transactions are conducted (see Tobin 1978; Eichengreen, Tobin and 
Wyplosz 1995)?  Or does it seek to quicken the pace at which financial transactions are 
conducted, effectively ‘oiling’ those wheels? 
In an attempt to answer such questions, the paper proceeds in three stages.  In the 
first section, I chart the main features of Labour’s discourse on the international financial 
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architecture.  The Blair Government clearly believes that the existing institutional 
framework has become increasingly dysfunctional.  It identifies misguided government 
policies as the primary source of increasing instability within the financial system, 
rejecting alternative assumptions that instability is a function of the operating logic of the 
system itself.  In consequence, it dismisses proposals for market-correcting reforms along 
the lines of a ‘sand in the wheels’ model, preferring instead market-reinforcing reforms 
designed to create additional market-based incentives for governments to adopt 
‘appropriate’ policies.  This can be seen perhaps most clearly in attempts to 
institutionalise new codes for fiscal and monetary transparency at the international level.  
‘Sand in the wheels’ reforms typically aim to increase the scope of autonomous national 
economic policy-making (Tobin 1978); New Labour’s transparency codes would appear 
more likely to have the opposite effect. 
In the second section, I introduce a political economy critique of purely market-
reinforcing reforms to the international financial architecture.  I suggest that such 
proposals rely rather more on an unquestioning belief in the stabilising effects of market 
forces than on empirical research into the microstructure of actually existing financial 
markets.  With prior processes of liberalisation now firmly rooted in the international 
financial system, speculative dynamics have come to dominate the way in which market 
prices form.  With individual investors ever more able to bypass attempts to impose 
external regulation, herding mentalities increasingly determine the trajectory of financial 
markets.  Knowledge of economic fundamentals is now less important as an indicator of 
which way the market will move next than knowledge of the prevailing market mood.  In 
such circumstances, the concept of a rational market equilibrium is rendered ever more 
 3 
meaningless.  Thus, existing patterns of market trading seem sure to blunt the potential 
impact of market-reinforcing reforms.  Reforms designed to provide governments with 
incentives to act in a manner consistent with traders’ perceived desire for equilibrium are 
unlikely to be suited to a context in which no such desire actually exists. 
I use the final section of the paper to explore the likely implications of the Blair 
Government’s reform proposals.  My analysis is grounded on the assumption that all 
financial architectures are a means of distributing systemic risks within society.  Set in 
such a context, it is clear that Labour imagines a future international financial architecture 
which reinforces the existing structure of social power, both domestically and 
internationally.  Its reforms would institutionalise an ever greater asymmetry in the 
prevailing pattern of systemic risks.  Proposals which serve to ‘oil the wheels’ of 
international finance are likely to induce further shifts in risk burdens from those who 
operate internally to the market to those who only have external connections to market 
outcomes.  Given that higher levels of market volatility now tend to be created 
endogenously as a reflection of momentum trading, this means that risk burdens are 
likely to be shifted from those who generate increased risk to those who are entirely 
powerless to control such events.  I conclude that New Labour’s ‘new Bretton Woods’ 
represents an attempt to open up new channels of redistribution in which risk flows from 






Building a ‘New Bretton Woods’ on Disciplinary Codes for Transparency 
 
Re-Shaping the Existing Institutional Framework 
Attempted political mobilisation aimed at reforming the Bretton Woods institutions 
is as old as the institutions themselves.  It would therefore be a mistake to see the Blair 
Government as the progenitor of this particular debate.  The G7 has had an official 
dialogue concerning the international financial architecture that significantly pre-dates 
New Labour’s period in office (see The Economist, 30.01.99, 5). 
Although the debate per se is not new, a new intensity has been added to it in recent 
years.  This is due to an ever more widespread assumption that, whilst never ideal, the 
current financial architecture is now more dysfunctional than at any time in its history.  
The much-derided performance of the international financial institutions in the midst of 
the Asian financial crisis is a salutary case in point.  A significant contradiction has been 
identified between the competencies of the Bretton Woods institutions and the prevailing 
economic context in which those institutions operate.  An institutional apparatus designed 
for a world of limited capital mobility would appear to be unable to perform regulative 
tasks suited to a world of increasingly interdependent capital markets.  On this point, 
there is general agreement. 
But this is also where agreement seems to stop.  For some, the preferred means of 
ensuring a better fit between institutional competencies and the international economic 
context is to recast the institutional competencies in a manner which reflects the existence 
of an increasingly interdependent system of national capital markets.  For others, the 
preferred means of ensuring a better fit between institutional competencies and 
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international economic context is to restore some semblance of autonomy to national 
capital markets, thus forcing the international economic context back into line with 
existing institutional competencies.  The Blair Government advocates the first, market-
reinforcing, strategy.  Indeed, the Party had explicitly rejected the latter, market-
correcting, strategy whilst still in opposition (see Brown 1995).  For New Labour, it is the 
competencies of the international financial institutions which are to be reshaped, not the 
highly liberalised international financial context in which those institutions operate.  The 
past is most definitely not something to be re-invented. 
As Gordon Brown told the House of Commons in a debate on the international 
financial architecture at a time of increasing instability within the world economy (Brown 
1998a): 
At the heart of the weaknesses exposed in [the world’s] financial systems is 
that for fifty years our policies for regulation, supervision, transparency and 
stability have been devised and developed for a world of relatively sheltered 
national economies with limited capital markets.  A new age requires a new 
approach …  Ministers agree that in this new interdependent and 
instantaneous global marketplace we must now create systems for 
supervision, transparency, regulation and stability that are as sophisticated as 
the markets they have to work with …  Institutional architecture devised in 
the 1940s for the economies of the 1940s must be reformed and strengthened 
to meet the challenges of the 1990s and … the 21st century. 
Such thoughts were also evident in a speech made around the same time by Patricia 
Hewitt, then Economic Secretary to the Treasury, to a seminar at Fleming’s Investment 
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Bank.  She argued (Hewitt 1998) that: “Today’s global economic problems are ones of 
the modern age.  They could not have happened when finance was confined within 
sheltered and wholly national financial systems.  These are new global problems which 
require new global solutions.” 
 
Linking (International) Economic Ideology to (Domestic) Political Concerns 
Labour has done more than merely re-position itself as an advocate of a global 
liberal status quo.  It now projects itself as an active promoter of increasing financial 
liberalisation.  The Prime Minister has argued that “capital liberalisation is right” (Blair 
1998b) and that “the market is an ally not an enemy … we understand the benefits of 
open markets” (Blair 2001c).  Such benefits, he suggests, will only accrue to an 
international community that is willing to engage in “a massive programme of 
liberalisation in opening up markets” (Blair 2001a).  This general principle translates 
more specifically for New Labour into “favouring an approach to capital account 
liberalisation that is bold in concept” (Hewitt 1998). 
It would seem to have become an issue of straightforward ideological commitment 
for New Labour that there is to be minimal, even no, public management of international 
capital flows.  The regulation of capital markets is to remain overwhelmingly a matter for 
the private sector; state restraint is the key to the prudent regulation of the international 
financial environment (see, for instance, Smith 2000).  So sure is Tony Blair of such a 
principle that he has started to use the word “axiomatic” to describe his commitment to it 
(Blair 2000a).  In this way, he now routinely attempts to pass off a statement of ideology 
as a self-evident ‘truth’.  Unlike some other areas, New Labour’s deeds have matched its 
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words on this issue.  Since the earliest days of the current administration, the Government 
has pushed for western finance ministers to accept proposals for a new IMF code of 
conduct on financial openness (Brown 1997). 
Such proposals are not merely a statement of (international) economic ideology; 
they also reflect (domestic) political strategy.  As Andrew Baker suggests, the 
reproduction of a distinctive social basis of the British state during the post-war period 
has ensured that Britain is “heavily integrated” into international circuits of finance 
(Baker 1999, 84).  As a financial centre, London is conceptually distinguishable from 
New York, Chicago, Tokyo, Frankfurt and Zurich in the extent to which it specialises in 
servicing internationally oriented capital flows (Martin 1999).  Domestic investors 
operating within London’s markets can therefore expect to be advantaged by proposals to 
deepen existing tendencies towards financial market liberalisation. 
The social basis of financial trading has changed markedly in Britain in recent 
years.  An ever greater number of people now have their savings invested in ways that are 
susceptible to financial fluctuations.  As much, more are now exposed to the dominant 
pattern of trading exhibited on financial markets.  For some, such exposure is consciously 
accepted as savings are increasingly being moved out of simple interest earning bank 
accounts and into PEPs and ISAs which offer higher returns.  For others, increased 
exposure has been an unintended consequence of home ownership and private pension 
cover. 
Significantly, many of these new investors also constitute the political 
constituencies of ‘Middle England’ to which New Labour has specifically tailored its 
electoral strategy.  Thus, the social basis of the British state is currently oriented towards 
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an international economic policy which is deeply rooted in the Government’s own party 
political concerns.  Whilst it would clearly be wrong to suggest that the tendency towards 
financial liberalisation is all of Labour’s making, the policies of the Blair Government 
have certainly bolstered the existing orientation of the British state in this respect. 
So long as Labour continues to act as if its future electability is tied directly to the 
reproduction of the prevailing social basis of the British state, it will be faced with a 
(largely self-induced) domestic political context which constrains its ability to argue the 
case for ‘throwing sand in the wheels’ of international finance.  We must conclude from 
this that the core principle of increasing financial market openness is strategically 
embedded in the social and institutional relationships of the electoral coalition that the 
Government is seeking to hold together. 
 
Transparency Codes and Rules-Based Governance Regimes 
The Blair Government proposes a ‘new Bretton Woods’ based on the 
institutionalisation of free market norms within all the world’s capital markets.  It seeks 
to introduce binding rules, to be policed by the IMF on a truly global terrain, in order to 
limit the scope of government interventions into financial markets.  As Gordon Brown 
has argued: “the answer to the uncertainty and unpredictability of ever more rapid 
financial flows is clear long-term policy objectives …[and]… the certainty and 
predictability of well understood procedural rules for monetary and fiscal policy” (Brown 
1999).  Tony Blair has been equally explicit in his support for a rules-based governance 
regime.  He has made the case to “strengthen the IMF by agreeing new international rules 
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of the game which match today’s instantaneous and interdependent capital markets.  This 
means new disciplines, new procedures and new thinking” (Blair 1998b). 
The Blair Government has identified increased transparency as the means to reduce 
financial volatility through purely market-reinforcing reforms.  As Alistair Darling 
argued whilst Chief Secretary to the Treasury, “economic policy must be open and 
transparent.  Openness builds confidence and credibility” (Darling 1998).  And it is upon 
such confidence and credibility that the Blair Government believes financial stability is 
secured (Blair 2001c).  For New Labour, “the greater the degree of secrecy, the greater 
the suspicion that the truth is being obscured and the books cooked.  But the greater the 
degree of transparency – the more information that is published on why decisions are 
made and the more the safeguards against the manipulation of information – the less 
likely is it that investors will be suspicious of the Government’s intentions” (Brown 
2000b).  Working to these principles, the Chancellor used Britain’s Presidency of the G7 
in 1998 to commit the Bretton Woods institutions to ensuring that all countries “comply 
with an internationally agreed code of conduct on monetary and fiscal policy, requiring 
greater transparency”.  To this end, “each country should specify its objectives for 
monetary policy, identify responsibility for achieving these objectives, and for reporting 
and explaining monetary policy decisions and financial regulations” (Brown 1998a). 
Within the terms of the Government’s transparency discourse, volatility ensues 
when individual market participants act rationally on the basis of incomplete information.  
In circumstances in which governments impede transparency by preventing the release of 
market-sensitive data, significant distortions can be introduced into the market, turning 
volatility into systemic instability.  The argument is that if markets can only be expected 
 10 
to be in equilibrium in an underlying context of complete information, then the solution 
to observed levels of instability is to provide the markets with such a context.  As a 
consequence, market-reinforcing reforms concentrate on creating an incentive structure 
for governments that will force them to increase the flow of information into the market.  
Binding rules which lock-in a preferred pattern of behaviour offer a convenient means of 
establishing such a structure.  In terms of their shared focus on the significance of binding 
rules, ‘transparency’ is the international economic equivalent of the ‘prudence’ which 
Labour consistently espouses at home. 
The two quite clearly go together in New Labour discourse.  Government thinking 
on the international financial architecture is that there must be “a rigorous adherence to a 
disciplined fiscal and monetary policy” if the implementation of transparency codes is to 
ensure that market actors receive information consistent with “long-term stability” (Blair 
2000d).  Likewise, although the Government believes that national monetary authorities 
must commit themselves to “better exchanges of information [in order to] reduce 
systemic risk”, this is deemed insufficient in itself unless set within the context of “an 
internationally agreed code of conduct” relating to minimum standards of monetary 
“discipline” (Brown 1998b).  In the Chancellor’s words, “openness, accountability and 
transparency to keep markets and the public properly informed” are necessary 
counterparts to ensuring that “objectives and institutions are not only credible but seen to 
be credible” (Brown 2000a). 
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The Contested Scope of Transparency Codes Post-Asian Financial Crisis 
The Blair Government is by no means alone in proposing such arrangements.  The 
Clinton Administration occupied much the same policy agenda during its period in office.  
For both, increased transparency in information disclosure holds the key to future 
systemic stability.  As former US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers argued, 
international finance can only be successfully liberalised so long as it is possible to 
construct institutional guarantees of “more prudent management of national balance 
sheets” (Summers 1999). 
Predictably, then, the Clinton administration welcomed Gordon Brown’s proposals 
for a new IMF code of practice for fiscal transparency, identifying it as a means of 
locking-in the principle of sound money within an international institutional framework 
(see Baker 1999, 95).  Summers’ response to these proposals was to agree that “the 
international community should help shape the choices of countries” in the sphere of 
monetary policy (Summers 1999). 
An institutional architecture designed specifically to constrain the scope of 
domestic policy is clearly contrary both to the operational rationale of the original 
Bretton Woods agreements and also to Tobin’s proposals for international financial 
reform.  However, neither Brown nor Blair would appear to have any qualms about 
acknowledging the additional constraints imposed by such a code on the policy autonomy 
of elected governments.  Indeed, in speech after speech, they have extolled the virtues of 
an institutional framework that allows a suitably empowered IMF to impart more 
discipline on domestic policy choice (see, for instance, Blair 2000a; Brown 2000b, 
2000c). 
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In this respect, Labour would appear to be pushing on a door which, if not yet fully 
open given the hesitance of many IMF member countries to such proposals, is certainly 
ajar.  The IMF, for one, seems only too content to be granted these new disciplinary 
powers.  It has welcomed the introduction of a Special Data Dissemination Standard, 
whereby the right to negotiate loans through the Fund is made conditional upon meeting 
international standards for full public disclosure of economic data (Presidential 
Commission 1999, 26).  More controversially, it has proposed revisions to its own 
articles of agreement that would make fully liberalised capital accounts a prerequisite of 
continued membership (IMF 2000). 
There would thus seem to be significant momentum behind elite political 
mobilisation designed to bring the operation of all national capital markets in line with a 
single global liberal norm.  This momentum is firmly rooted in particularistic Anglo-
American pressure for further financial liberalisation.  Only when pressurised at G7 
meetings to tone down the implied criticism of other countries’ implementation of 
inappropriate policies have British and American leaders acknowledged that transparency 
codes should apply more broadly than just to ‘imprudent’ governments located in other 
regions of the world.  The response to the Asian financial crisis, first from the Clinton 
Administration and latterly from the Blair Government, has been to suggest that 
transparency imperatives imply a two-way process of information dissemination between 
governments and markets. 
It may well be the case that the burden of such imperatives falls disproportionately 
on the public rather than the private sector, but there is nonetheless some sense of burden-
sharing.  For example, the 1999 Report of the Presidential Commission investigating 
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proposals for a new financial architecture reflected significant shifts in the public 
discourse on financial liberalisation that had become evident in the United States in the 
two years following the Asian financial crisis.  It insisted that the demands for additional 
transparency applied not only to national monetary authorities, but also to individual 
market actors, the banking sector and international financial institutions (Presidential 
Commission 1999, 27).  Similarly, in retrospective analyses of its own performance in 
Asia, the IMF became increasingly adamant that codes of practice for public information 
disclosure would not in themselves guarantee satisfactory prudential regulation unless 
extended to include the private sector (IMF 2000). 
Towards the end of 1998, Gordon Brown also began to argue that transparency 
rules for corporate governance and for IMF interventions would be an appropriate 
supplement to those that applied solely to governments.1  More recently, Brown has lent 
support for the creation of a permanent independent evaluation unit for the IMF.2
Despite these shifts in public discourse, neither the British or American 
Governments nor the IMF has been willing to go as far as many academic commentators 
  
However, at the same time that his Chancellor was effecting this subtle change in 
Britain’s position on the international financial architecture, the Prime Minister made it 
clear that these were not responses to British concerns per se, so much as a strategic 
move to seek a compromise that would preserve Labour’s multilateral codes for fiscal 
transparency in the face of potential dissent from other IMF member countries.  In a 
speech to a British Chamber of Commerce dinner in China (Blair 1998b), he referred 
pointedly to these being “French and other ideas for strengthening the governance of 
International Financial Institutions”. 
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in suggesting that the true source of systemic instability within international financial 
markets stems directly from the private sector, because it is market actors who have a 
profit maximising incentive to obscure information flows about the structure of the 
market.  Labour’s discourse on the international financial architecture remains much 
closer to Blair’s original statement that a ‘new Bretton Woods’ should be oriented 
towards the single strategic goal of allowing financial investors to “price risk more 
accurately [in relation to] future government policy” (Blair 1998a). 
Labour’s concern for establishing a new regulatory apparatus to protect the price 
mechanism would therefore seem to be aimed overwhelmingly at limiting destabilising 
price effects whose origin is external to the market, and located most particularly within 
the policy process.3
 
  Its proposals for a new financial architecture remain much less fully 
formed in relation to price volatility that has its roots in dynamics which are internal to 
capital markets themselves.  Such reasoning is acceptable only in circumstances in which 
we can be sure that capital markets display a natural tendency to equilibrium, so that 
speculative dynamics do not unnecessarily prejudice market outcomes.  However, in the 
following section, I argue that there are no grounds on which it is possible to sustain such 
an assumption.  Even The Economist, doyen of liberal economic opinion as it is, suggests 
that purely market-reinforcing reforms “miss the point” if international financial markets 





Speculative Activity and Endogenously Generated Market Volatility 
 
The Practical Implications of Financial Liberalisation 
Labour’s proposals for a purely market-reinforcing ‘new Bretton Woods’ may 
provide little, even no, space for the introduction of a Tobin tax.  Yet, even the most 
staunch advocate of financial liberalisation is unlikely to disagree with the underlying 
assumption on which Tobin grounds his argument for a deterrent tax on hot money: 
namely, that the importance of financial institutions on social outcomes is now more 
pronounced than ever before.  A consensus exists amongst academic economists that 
financial markets now shape the trajectory of economic development to a greater extent 
than ever before. 
This is undeniably true – for example, the daily trading volume on the world’s 
foreign exchange markets alone now exceeds US $2 trillion.  However, there is far less 
agreement amongst economists over the interpretation of figures such as this.  Is it a good 
or a bad thing that trading on financial markets now dwarves all other kinds of economic 
activity?  Do current patterns of financial trading impact upon the real economy?  If so, 
do they have a detrimental effect (causing increased instability) or a positive effect 
(leading to more efficient outcomes)? 
Sadly, answers to these questions cannot be found in New Labour’s public 
pronouncements on the international financial architecture – indeed, there is no clear 
evidence that these questions have even been asked.  Labour’s stance tends to be to 
outline the conditions by which other governments must abide if further financial 
liberalisation is to be successful, rather than to ask whether liberalisation is desirable in 
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the first place.  The Government’s commitment to liberalisation appears almost solely 
ideological.  In this section, I seek answers to the above questions as a means of 
exploring the practical implications of ideological commitments to further financial 
liberalisation. 
Despite the fact that public discourse on the international financial architecture 
suggests a single homogeneous market structure, real life markets are significantly more 
differentiated.  My analysis in this section will focus specifically on the foreign exchange 
market.  There are three reasons for this, which overlap the three broad concerns in this 
article.  Firstly, it is typical for the foreign exchanges to be treated as the international 
financial markets in public discourse.  Such is their influence (both real and perceived), 
that currency trading tends to be conflated with international financial market trading in 
general.  Secondly, given London’s status as leader in this particular market, it can 
reasonably be assumed that, whenever a British Government talks about a new 
international financial architecture, it is most interested in trying to determine future 
forms of regulation on the foreign exchanges.  Thirdly, the principal goal of the original 
Bretton Woods agreement was to design an institutional framework that could pacify 
speculative activity on the foreign exchanges; proposals for Tobin-style taxes on 
international currency transactions have the same purpose. 
 
Speculation and Exchange Rate Volatility 
The ability to distinguish unambiguously between exchange rate variability which 
is ‘excessively volatile’ and that which is merely ‘highly volatile’ is a source of deep and 
lasting division within the economics literature.  This distinction is extremely relevant to 
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the public policy-making debate on the new financial architecture.  In circumstances in 
which foreign exchange markets display structural features of excessive volatility, 
arguments for market-correcting reforms are greatly enhanced.  Labour’s transparency 
discourse suggests that the foreign exchange market needs reinforcing rather than 
correcting.  As such, it would only appear to fit with a world in which exchange rate 
variability is highly rather than excessively volatile. 
Economists have always assumed that, under conditions of freely floating exchange 
rates, those rates could never be more stable than the economies that they are supposed to 
reflect (Friedman 1953).  As Jeffrey Frankel argues, “Even if foreign exchange markets 
are functioning properly, fundamental economic determinants, such as monetary policy, 
should produce a lot of variability in the exchange rate” (Frankel 1996, 52).  Indeed, 
Rudiger Dornbusch’s classic ‘overshooting’ model posits that some degree of variability 
is built into the very fabric of foreign exchange markets.  Dornbusch argues that the price 
mechanism adjusts much more rapidly in foreign exchange markets than it does in the 
commodities markets to which they are linked.  This mismatch in the speed of adjustment 
causes the short-run equilibrium in foreign exchange markets to overshoot the long-run 
equilibrium (Dornbusch 1976).  The potentially destabilising impact of speculators on 
foreign exchange prices is entirely absent from Dornbusch’s model.  Yet, even in these 
circumstances, the tendency is towards volatility.  If a hypothetical world in which there 
is no speculation is typified by systemic market volatility, what effects are likely to be 
visible in the real world in which speculation is pervasive? 
If rational overshooting were the only source of variability within foreign exchange 
markets, then the extent of market volatility would be wholly predictable.  However, the 
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influence of speculative dynamics within the market is now so pronounced that it renders 
even the future direction of volatility largely unpredictable (Kearney 1996, 92-3). 
Trade in foreign exchange is no longer a function either of trade in commodities or 
investment in long-term productive capacity.  The speculative demand for money now 
clearly dominates all combined sources of monetary demand that are embedded within 
the real economy.  The Bank for International Settlements calculates that ‘ultimate’ 
customers – that is, those located within the real economy – have been all but crowded 
out of the foreign exchange market.  Less than one in five foreign exchange market 
transactions are now conducted with a non-financial customer (Frankel 1996, 41).  In 
London, that percentage is even lower (Frieden and Dornbusch 1993, 19).  With daily 
turnover on the foreign exchanges now averaging over US $2 trillion (The Economist 
1999), the 82% of worldwide market trades which are speculative in nature constitute an 
enormous influence on the operation of the international financial system more generally. 
Numerous academic analyses have concluded that the ever greater influence of 
speculation on overall patterns of market trading has ensured that trading volume is 
increasingly closely correlated with volatility (see, for example, Frankel and Froot 1990; 
Hsieh and Kleidon 1996; Jorion 1996).  Given the recent exponential increase in the flow 
of foreign exchange, a similar increase in market volatility is also to be expected.  Indeed, 
such is the influence of speculative dynamics on foreign exchange prices that textbook 
models are now almost entirely superfluous to an understanding of the price mechanism 
within currency markets.  Even Dornbusch’s ‘overshooting’ model looks dated.  
Dornbusch himself talks of the way in which foreign exchange markets now routinely 
‘overshoot the overshooting equilibrium’ (Frieden and Dornbusch 1993, 16).  To the 
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extent that overshooting theory can explain long-term tendencies within the real 
exchange rate, it leaves short-term movements completely unexplained.  Over short time 
horizons, the concept of equilibrium would seem to be altogether redundant (Watson 
1999). 
 
Labour’s Silence on Speculation 
Labour’s purely market-reinforcing proposals for a new international financial 
architecture sit uneasily alongside these conclusions.  The rationale for maintaining 
purely private regulation of international capital flows is that the market will always be 
better than the government in identifying its own equilibrium position.  Here, however, 
the impact of speculative dynamics on the price mechanism is so pronounced that the 
very idea of an equilibrium position has become increasingly meaningless.  Even the very 
existence of speculative activity undermines the theoretical basis of the Blair 
Government’s transparency discourse.  Additional transparency is only the optimal 
institutional fix for market instability in circumstances in which market traders act solely 
in line with economic fundamentals. 
Given the pervasive nature of speculation within contemporary financial markets, 
the assumption that any market has a unique and stable equilibrium relating solely to 
economic fundamentals tends to be made more as a matter of faith than on the basis of 
empirical evidence.  Yet, more so than any other, the market in foreign exchange betrays 
the fact that it has no mysterious alchemy outlining where its equilibrium position should 
be.  As Paul Krugman argues, “foreign exchange markets behave much more like the 
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unstable and irrational asset markets described by Keynes than the efficient markets 
described by modern finance theory” (Krugman 1989, 61). 
If this is indeed the case (and there would seem to be no reason to think that it is 
not), New Labour’s silence on the issue of speculation would seem to be a significant 
omission from its public pronouncements on the international financial architecture.  As 
detailed in the previous section, Labour’s official position has shifted in the wake of the 
Asian financial crisis to suggest that the private sector, whilst definitely not to blame for 
the instability exhibited by international financial markets, must not be exempt from 
transparency codes.  However, the proposed extension of transparency codes to the 
private sector appears only to require that firms located within the productive economy 
feed financial markets with information relating to their company accounts (see Brown 
1998a, b).  At no stage has it been suggested that the same principle applies also to those 
firms that operate within the financial markets themselves. 
Yet, it is the actions of these firms that have led to the prevalence of speculative 
dynamics within the market environment.  Set against such a fact, the absence of the very 
idea of speculation from Labour’s public discourse on international finance appears 
somewhat anomalous.  It warrants no mention irrespective of the nature of the audience 
that is being addressed – whether this is an audience of financial market actors (where we 
might reasonably expect Labour to be cautious in broaching the subject of excessive 
speculation – see Blair 2000c); MPs (see Brown 1998b); fellow Labour Party members 
(who might be rather more welcoming of such a critique – see Brown 1995); academics 
(see Brown 2000b); or people in developing countries most directly affected by financial 
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instability (who are likely to be most receptive of attempts to refocus the debate about 
international finance onto the issue of speculation – see Blair 2001c). 
Given the absence of a discussion of speculation, we are left to conclude that 
Labour assumes that international financial markets operate in the manner of textbook 
markets.  In other words, in all instances the market-clearing price is determined 
according to the forces of supply and demand within that market.  However, in 
circumstances in which speculation is rife, it makes no sense to follow the textbook 
model in which the market’s demand and supply schedules are formed independently – 
the former by a relatively closed class of buyers, the latter by a relatively closed class of 
sellers.  Within speculative foreign exchange markets, individual market actors are both 
buyers and sellers at the same time.  The distinction between the market’s demand and 
supply schedules consequently breaks down.  Demand and supply are not independently 
given; they are mutually constituted to reflect the dominant expectation about which way 
the market is most likely to move next. 
Speculators consciously try to ride on the back of trends within the foreign 
exchanges, as a trendless market embodies risk-return equations which are much less 
conducive to quick and easy profit-making than a market exhibiting an obvious 
momentum.  The most important fact about such trends is that the market actors who find 
them to be so much to their advantage are themselves responsible for creating them.  
Each actor within the market knows that, should flows of private speculative capital be 
organised ‘collectively’ with the specific aim of embedding a certain trend, then this will 
always become the dominant trend.  This knowledge is sufficient in itself to act as a 
further incentive to trend-chasing speculative behaviour (Watson 1999). 
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Internally Generated Market Instability 
The Blair Government has thus far ignored arguments for correcting excessive 
market volatility by re-imposing capital market segmentation (see, for example, Brown 
2000b; Blair 2001b; Smith 2000; Hewitt 1998; Byers 1999b).  Such arguments – like 
those for a Tobin tax – are based on the assumption that trend-chasing speculative 
behaviour drives the market away from prices that are consistent with underlying 
economic fundamentals.  Empirical evidence shows that investors devote far less 
resources to gaining a full knowledge of fundamentals than they do to identifying the 
dominant market trend (see, for instance, Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Lyons 1995; 
Obstfeld 1995).  The most successful forecasters of speculative price movements would 
appear, somewhat paradoxically, to be those who look least at fundamentals (Taylor and 
Allen 1992).  The knowledge that matters most to the typical foreign exchange trader 
does not concern the macroeconomic stance of the governments whose currencies are 
being traded.  Rather, it concerns the kind of deals that other traders are offering, plus an 
expectation of how those deals are likely to change over the short-run (see Goodhart, Ito 
and Payne 1996). 
Set in such a context, most of the short-term variance in exchange rates appears 
unconnected to ‘news’ relating to the economy.  As a consequence, it is difficult to 
believe that public policy-making decisions are the source of excessive volatility on the 
foreign exchanges.  In turn, Labour’s reform proposals for the international financial 
architecture, which attempt to protect the price mechanism from shocks that are external 
to the market and concentrated in the policy environment, would seem to be almost 
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wholly directed at the wrong target.  How can this be expected to dampen down volatility 
on the foreign exchanges when most of the volatility is generated internally to the market 
itself?  No degree of transparency in the information flows from government to market 
can ever be sufficient to ensure market stability when the majority of individual market 
actors pay so little attention to what governments are doing in the first place.  Prudence 
may well be a virtue in New Labour’s eyes, but there can be no guarantee that any 
amount of prudence will ever be rewarded with tranquillity on the foreign exchanges. 
Indeed, there is little incentive for market actors to provide such tranquillity in 
circumstances in which they can force self-fulfilling speculative prophecies that prove to 
be far more profitable (see Eichengreen, Tobin and Wyplosz 1995, 165).  Such is the 
contemporary dominance of the speculative motive for trading foreign exchange that 
individual speculators often engage in deliberate destabilisation as the easiest way to 
make money.  The phenomenon of ‘noise’ trading, for instance, materialises only because 
it is possible to generate profit from intentionally prolonging existing market volatility 
(Davis 1996, 138).  ‘Noise’ traders both react to extrapolative expectations of the future 
trajectory of the market and, by their own trend-chasing actions, serve to harden such 
expectations within the market (Dunbar 2000; Shiller 2000).  An expectations bias has 
become a structural feature of the foreign exchange market, such that the forward 
discount rate within the futures market now typically “points the wrong way as a 
predictor of the [long-run real] exchange rate” (Frankel 1996, 53).  The persistence of this 
expectations bias can be understood in two ways: firstly, as conclusive evidence of 
market inefficiency; and, secondly, as conclusive evidence of excessive volatility. 
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As the above analysis suggests, the source of excessive exchange-rate volatility is 
endogenous to the market itself.  As such, it would seem to be relatively easy to explain 
proposals that seek to implement market-correcting reforms to the existing financial 
architecture.  The available evidence highlights the extent to which a deregulated foreign 
exchange market produces patterns of trading which are detrimental to the economy as a 
whole; therefore, additional layers of regulation would seem to be required to produce 
more efficient market outcomes.  By contrast, further explanation would seem to be 
necessary where we see purely market-reinforcing reforms being advocated.  For, it is 
previous market-reinforcing reforms and, in particular, the prior liberalisation of the 
financial system, which would appear to set the context within which current market 
failures have become possible. 
If this is indeed correct, then New Labour’s proposals for a ‘new Bretton Woods’ 
must be unpacked further.  At the very least, those proposals would not seem to be 
shaped by an empirically grounded analysis of the existing microstructure of international 
financial markets.  In the following section, I return to the suggestion that those proposals 
are shaped more by the politics than the economics of New Labour, by assessing the 
probable impact of its market-reinforcing reforms on the wider political environment.  In 
particular, I focus on changes to the distribution of risk which are likely to be triggered 
within the financial system in the event of the Blair Government’s proposals for 






The International Financial Architecture and Systemic Risk Distributions 
 
Risk-Sharing Within Financial Markets 
Two elements explain the existence of all financial markets: time and uncertainty.  
The inability definitively to predict the future state of the economy means that private 
saving and investment decisions are constrained multi-period optimisation problems.  
Throughout their history, financial markets have been created in order to match creditors 
and debtors who hold the same assumptions about the most likely trajectory of future 
economic fundamentals.4
Set in such a context, there would seem to be one supreme irony in the current 
pattern of trading on the foreign exchanges.  The development of a complex structure of 
foreign exchange markets has been for the ostensible purpose of risk management.  Yet, 
the current dominance of speculative activity within those markets has generated such 
pronounced volatility that this in turn has increased the overall level of risk within the 
economy.  Far from the market serving to ameliorate the effects of exogenous shocks on 
the economic system, it actually serves to diffuse shocks which it produces endogenously 
into that system. 
  In circumstances in which a suitable ‘pair’ is found for 
everyone, the market will tend to display a stable risk-return structure.  In theory, then, 
financial markets should act as a force for stabilisation.  Their whole raison d’être is to 
facilitate risk-sharing, to ensure that no-one is exposed to undue levels of risk emerging 
from exogenous shocks to the economic system. 
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How, then, is it possible to explain New Labour’s ‘new Bretton Woods’ proposals?  
For, by advocating further liberalisation of international finance, such proposals would 
create a context still more conducive to the speculative activity that generates excessive 
volatility on the foreign exchanges.  Viewed merely from a systemic perspective, there 
appears to be a clear contradiction here.  Indeed, so pronounced is that contradiction that 
it is perhaps necessary to look beyond systemic explanations altogether, to locate an 
understanding of the Blair Government’s proposals for international financial reform 
within the context of the dynamics of the British economy. 
 
Financial Liberalisation and British Economic History 
The political science literature on Britain’s relative economic decline offers one 
possible point of departure.  The argument to be found there can be simply stated.  It is 
suggested that the British economy has experienced a persistent shortfall in productive 
capacity, and that this can be attributed to the particular social basis of the British state.  
Britain is assumed to stand out in comparison to other states, to the extent that its 
institutions have locked-in ‘financial interests’ at the very heart of the public policy-
making process (see for instance Ingham 1984; Glyn and Sutcliffe 1986; Rubinstein 
1994; see also English and Kenny 2000).  A self-perpetuating cycle has consequently 
been set in motion, whereby the dominance of finance skews the policy output of the 
British state in a way that merely serves to reinforce that dominance.  Set in such a 
context, Labour’s refusal to contemplate market-correcting reforms to the international 
financial architecture can simply be read off from the overbearing influence of ‘financial 
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interests’ on the domestic political agenda.  London’s status as the world’s foremost 
foreign exchange market can, of course, be enlisted as evidence to support such a view. 
However, whilst superficially attractive, this account is clearly limited.  The idea of 
a single set of ‘financial interests’ on which the whole argument rests suggests financial 
market homogeneity.  Yet, there are no grounds to sustain such an assumption.  The 
financial system represents the complex aggregation of a whole series of individual 
markets which, because they trade in assets that are competitive investments, often have 
mutually incompatible interests.  For instance, should the volatility which ‘noise’ traders 
bring to foreign exchange markets increase the perceived risk of investing in corporate 
equity, we should expect to see investors moving funds out of stocks and into the 
comparative safety of government bonds.  In these circumstances, it may be possible to 
talk of a coalition of interests between the foreign exchange and the bond markets.  Yet, it 
is clear that such a coalition does not extend to the stock market.  Quite simply, it is not 
possible to theorise financial capital in terms of a static and undifferentiated interest; nor, 
consequently, in terms of an ability to impose a logic of a similarly static and 
undifferentiated structural power. 
It is beyond question that many sectors of British finance are deeply integrated into 
international circuits of capital.  Yet, a history of ‘financial hegemony’ is less relevant to 
understanding the process of integration than is a history of Britain’s unusual current 
account position.  Figures for the current account record the international flows of goods 
and services into, and out of, a particular country.  When outflows dominate inflows, the 
current account is in surplus; when inflows dominate outflows, the current account is in 
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deficit.  Compared with other advanced industrialised economies, Britain historically has 
experienced large current account deficits (Pollard 1992, 266-8). 
This situation has important consequences.  In order to maintain some sense of 
stability in the overall balance of payments position, structural deficits on the current 
account need to be offset by structural surpluses on the capital account.  Accordingly, 
countries that experience persistent current account deficits also tend to be countries 
whose financial systems display a high degree of integration into international structures 
in an attempt to derive surpluses on the capital account.  Long-run savings-investment 
correlations suggest that Britain has the highest measure of international capital mobility 
of any G7 economy (Sarno and Taylor 1998, 17, 24).  This in turn reflects the 
longitudinal data that show Britain’s current account position to be more deeply in deficit 
for a longer period of time than that of any of its peers (Hoffman 1998, 21, 33). 
It would therefore seem possible to construct a simple economic rationale for 
Labour’s discursive positioning in relation to the international financial architecture.  
Rather than attempt to impose increased sectoral balance onto the structures of the British 
economy, it has advocated an alternative ‘quick-fix’ solution to Britain’s persistent 
current account deficit through the reconstitution of international financial relations.  
‘Sand in the wheels’ reforms to the existing international financial architecture promise to 
introduce new forms of capital market segmentation (Frieden and Dornbusch 1993, 35).  
Were such circumstances to ensue, it is likely that it would become progressively more 
difficult for Britain to sustain the capital account position necessary to offset its historic 
current account deficit.  Only in circumstances in which liberalising reforms constitute 
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the basis of the international financial architecture can the British economy be expected 
to remain free from significant long-term balance of payments constraints. 
In the hypothetical world of a truly frictionless global circuit of capital, current 
account imbalances simply would not matter, because it would always be possible to 
finance even a permanent current account deficit from a global pool of world savings 
(Feldstein and Horioka 1980).  However, as The Economist has recently noted, investors 
continue to act in a way which suggests that current accounts do still matter.  
Contemporary patterns of trading imply that market sentiment will tolerate government 
inactivity on deficit-correction only within defined limits (The Economist 1999, 127).  
The actions of the Blair Government suggest that it agrees.  Its foreign economic policy 
has been motivated throughout its period of office by concerns that countries adversely 
affected by speculative activities may reject proposals to consolidate progress towards 
systemic financial liberalisation (Baker 1999, 94-5; Coates and Hay 2001).  In other 
words, New Labour’s ‘new Bretton Woods’ discourse is animated by the fear that other 
countries’ refusal to be bound indefinitely by liberalising norms would ensure that the 
correction of Britain’s current account imbalance became the sole responsibility of the 
British government.  In this sense, it is unsurprising that Labour has been at the forefront 
of calls to make open capital accounts a prerequisite of IMF membership; thus, removing 
the need for sustaining active consent to liberalising norms in the future. 
In effect, the Blair Government has been attempting to harness the discipline of a 
new international financial architecture in order to distribute the risks of Britain’s historic 
current account deficit around the international economic system as a whole.  This 
certainly does not conform to the effects that economists have in mind when they talk 
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about the risk-sharing functions of financial markets; all the same, it is a risk-sharing 
function of sorts. 
 
The Social Risks of Further Financial Liberalisation 
Of course, this is not the only impact on the distribution of systemic risk that 
Labour’s proposals for international financial reform could be expected to have.  
Financial markets impact upon the lives of ordinary people way beyond their capacity to 
control events (see Strange 1998; Shiller 2000).  New Labour’s ‘new Bretton Woods’ 
discourse, insofar as it offers the prospect of more liberalising reforms, threatens to 
undermine still further society’s ability to shape the distribution of risks created by 
excessive market volatility.  Having rejected ‘sand in the wheels’ reforms, Labour has 
dismissed the possibility of developing regulatory structures which shift the management 
of risk back into the private sector.  It now appears happy to accept a fundamental 
mismatch between those who create risk within the financial system (trend-chasing 
market actors), and those who are forced to accept the burden of risk relayed through that 
system (those in society least able to insure themselves against such risks). 
No institutional architecture becomes established unless there is a political coalition 
capable of sustaining the social settlement which that architecture shapes.  Any 
framework of institutions should therefore be seen as a statement of public aspiration.  
New Labour’s ‘new Bretton Woods’ discourse is no different in this respect.  Quite 
clearly, it represents more than an articulation of merely technical economic concerns 
relating to the stability of the international financial system.  It is also a comment on the 
government’s wider political intent.  The technical economic concerns may constitute 
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little more than a legitimising backdrop to what is essentially a new politics of 
redistribution.  This is a two-way redistribution: put simply, wealth flows from society to 
financial markets at the same time as risk flows from financial markets to society. 
As Ulrich Beck argues in his seminal study of the ‘risk society’, there tends to be a 
distinctive social distribution of risk conforming to more or less regular patterns (Beck 
1992, 22-6).  Certain groups are systematically more likely to be affected than others by 
an overall increase in risk levels.  Moreover, the social distribution of risk and the social 
distribution of wealth are intimately linked.  Those with limited access to wealth 
repeatedly find it more difficult to insure themselves against exposure to risk. 
This is particularly evident in relation to the risks induced by excessive volatility on 
international financial markets.  As Susan Strange argues, “ordinary people ... have never 
been asked if they wanted to gamble their jobs, their savings, their income in [a] casino 
form of capitalism” (Strange 1998, 3-4).  Yet, this is precisely the kind of effects that 
they have to endure as a progressively liberalised financial architecture facilitates ever 
greater market ‘runs’ and ever greater social consequences of such ‘runs’. 
The effects of the Asian financial crisis are an extreme, yet by no means atypical, 
case in point.  The management of the social consequences of that crisis by the 
international community revealed a marked asymmetry in the distribution of the burden 
of the systemic risks that the crisis exposed.  Asian populations paid the costs of 
adjustment to the crisis in terms of lost jobs, lost savings and lower living standards.  At 
the same time, the international investors whose actions created the speculative bubble 
that led to the crisis in the first place were able to rely on international institutional 
guarantees that default was not an option for the afflicted countries to minimise their risk 
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exposures arising from the crisis (see, for instance, Radelet and Sachs 1998; Bello 1998; 
Lee 1998). 
Such outcomes suggest that some have greater means than others to insure 
themselves against systemic risks emanating from international financial markets.  
Indeed, it is necessary to question whether most citizens have the ability to insure 
themselves at all.  Returning to Beck’s analysis of the ‘risk society’, he argues that, 
typically, it is possible to secure against risk (Beck 1992, 20).  For, risks tend to be 
willingly accepted on the expectation that some future reward will be forthcoming to 
more than compensate for the present risk position.  It then becomes a matter of personal 
choice to what extent those risks are allowed to remain uncovered.  The greater the 
coverage taken out, the less will be the potential long-run gain, but the greater will be the 
short-term security. 
However, it is questionable whether this scenario applies to the risks which 
originate in, and are diffused by, international financial markets.  As the above analysis 
has shown, the dominant mood of the market is now created endogenously by 
predominantly speculative dynamics.  This means that individual citizens have become 
ever more susceptible to the destabilising effects of market bubbles, and these are quite 
clearly effects over which they have no control.  In a highly deregulated international 
financial environment, not only are individual citizens increasingly powerless to insure 
themselves when the consequences of excessive financial volatility impact upon the real 
economy.  Governments are also increasingly powerless to provide collective insurance 
for their citizens by influencing the dominant mood of the market through exogenous 
intervention. 
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In such circumstances, it is clear that any attempt to reconstitute the burden of 
financial risk management must first entail a fundamental reorganisation of power and 
authority within society.  Yet, during its first five years in government, New Labour’s 
economic policy (in both its domestic and international orientation) has repeatedly 
demonstrated that it has few intentions to impose fundamental change onto the existing 
structure of social power.  Indeed, in terms of its proposals for the international financial 
architecture, it would appear to be advocating the further institutionalisation of both the 
current distribution of risk positions within the international economic system and also 







In his speech to the party’s centenary anniversary conference, Tony Blair suggested 
that if the underlying philosophy of New Labour could be summed up in one word, that 
word would be ‘progress’.  “We are Labour,” he argued, “because in the great historical 
debate we side with the progressives not the conservatives.  We are reformers: those who 
want to change the world not preserve it.  Those who know that no change benefits those 
who hold power, and change helps those without it” (Blair 2000b).  As was required at 
such an occasion, these were evocative words.  But the question remains: to what extent 
 34 
is it possible to accept this simple conflation of ‘reform’ and ‘progressive’ in order to 
imply that all reform must necessarily be progressive in nature? 
In terms of New Labour’s proposals for a ‘new Bretton Woods’, there can be no 
question that the Blair Government supports reform to the financial regime.  However, 
the most likely outcomes of its proposed reforms are more progressive in some areas than 
others and, on the whole, the progressiveness of its overall reform package remains in 
doubt. 
Gordon Brown in particular has been at the forefront of attempts to build an 
international consensus for alleviating the debt burdens of the most heavily indebted poor 
countries (see Brown 2000c, 2000d, 2001; see also Blair 2000a), and he has led the way 
in this respect by committing Britain to a programme through which the British 
Government unilaterally retires those countries’ debts that it holds.  Such measures 
undoubtedly deserve to be seen as progressive.  Yet, how do they fit in with the 
Government’s broader liberalising goals?  Are they any more than a means of securing a 
suitable basis for imposing liberalisation on the Third World?  Even if Labour does not 
see debt cancellation directly in terms of facilitating efficient liberalisation, it is clear that 
the Government’s concerns for retiring debt are secondary to its concerns for promoting 
further financial liberalisation.  It is in terms of this latter goal that the progressive nature 
of Labour’s reforms must be adjudicated. 
Stephen Byers has argued that the first priority for any institution of global 
economic governance must be to embed “a culture of responsible risk-taking” (Byers 
1999a).  However, Labour’s liberalising reforms to the international financial architecture 
would seem more likely to trigger greater rather than less market volatility.  The 
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Government’s transparency codes will make it much easier for individual market actors 
to identify the dominant mood of the market.  This in turn will increase the incentives for 
such actors to take positions within the market which bear no relation to underlying 
economic fundamentals, so long as their actions harden the prevailing market trend.  As a 
consequence, we can expect New Labour’s ‘new Bretton Woods’ to create a context in 
which financial markets operate ever further from equilibrium. 
Where would this leave Byers’ ‘culture of responsible risk-taking’?  Should 
financial market movements become entirely autonomous of fundamentals, swings in 
market sentiment are likely to have an increasingly adverse effect on those whose 
personal economic well-being is dependent on the reproduction of a stable economy.  
Such circumstances would entail a distinctive shift in the pattern of risk relayed through 
the international financial system.  For those within the markets, further financial 
liberalisation reduces the exposure to systemic risk, certainly insofar as market trends 
which are easier to spot lower the chances of being caught out on the wrong side of the 
market.  By contrast, for those outside the markets, further financial liberalisation 
increases the exposure to systemic risk.  Recent experiences of speculative bubbles which 
suddenly burst suggest that costs of adjustment to changes in the market mood are born 
just as much in terms of jobs as falling portfolio value.  What would be progressive about 
reform proposals which served to ‘oil the wheels’ of international finance and, as a 
consequence, induced a further shift in risk burdens from those who create the risk to 
those who are merely innocent victims of it? 
Of course, any advocate of ‘oiling the wheels’ reforms is likely to be able to enlist 
the support of some economist who will argue that international financial markets do not 
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act any more independently of fundamentals today than they have at any previous time.  
Two responses are appropriate.  The first is to suggest that such an argument can only be 
constructed on the basis of bad economics and, in particular, a tendency to elevate market 
ideology above the findings of empirical research into the microstructure of actually 
existing markets.  The second is to suggest that, even if such an argument were to be 
grounded in rather better economics, it still misses the point.  Even if it can be proved 
beyond doubt that all speculation is a purely rational reflection of information about 
fundamentals, this does not invalidate the case for ‘throwing sand in the wheels’ of 
international finance.  The technical economic aspect of the debate about the international 
financial architecture should always remain secondary to its normative socio-economic 
aspect.  In order to sustain the case for ‘sand in the wheels’, it is only necessary to show 
that the social consequences of current patterns of speculation are inimical to a truly 
progressive politics.  This is relatively straightforward to do; so much so, that serious 
questions remain about the precise meaning of progress which New Labour has in mind 
when it outlines its proposals for a ‘new Bretton Woods’. 
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them of any potential blame; no-one other than myself can be held responsible for the opinions that appear 
in this article. 
1 This sentiment was first expressed explicitly in his statement to the House of Commons on the World 
Economy, 02.11.98. 
2 I am indebted to one of the BJPIR’s anonymous referees for reminding me of this fact. 
3 On the need to protect the price mechanism from shocks which emerge from the external and, in 
particular, the policy environment, see the following contribution to the academic literature made by Ed 
Balls, then Economic Advisor to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown (Balls 1998).  Note 
especially the length to which Balls feels compelled to go in order to explain the ‘necessity’ for 
governments to pre-commit monetary policy as a means of making credible policy pledges not to inject 
destabilising tendencies into the price mechanism. 
4 Creditors, of course, being those for whom the immediate task is to make a saving decision; debtors being 
those for whom the immediate task is to make an investment decision.  Each class of market actor can 
typically be assumed to want to make the decision which minimises the risk that it is necessary to bear at 
any given level of return. 
